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Socio-Political Implications 
of Job Reform 
Alexander J. Matejko 
The author examines the job reform movements develo-
ping in varions parts of the world, but particularly in the 
démocratie developed societies, may hâve in the long any 
substantial socio-political impact. 
Any substantial reshuffle of social rôles which leads to the reallo-
cation of power will hâve sooner or later some political implications.x 
The question is how much the job reform movements developing in 
various parts of the world, but particularly in the démocratie developed 
societies, may hâve in the long any substantial socio-political impact. 
In order to answer this questional it is advisable first of ail to locate it 
in the broader social framework. 
As we know, the progressing occupational rôle differentiation in 
societies gives rise to the inequalities in power, privilège and prestige. 
D. J. Treiman claims that «power and privilège are everywhere highly 
valued, and hence powerful and privileged occupations are highly re-
garded in ail societies» (Treiman, 1977:5). He has found a high (.79) 
intercorrelation of prestige ratings across pairs of countries (standard 
déviation of .14), a high concensus of thèse ratings in various coun-
tries, similarity of the occupational hiérarchies not only in prestige but 
also in éducation and in income, a positive corrélation between the si-
milarity in level of industrialization and the similarity in prestige ran-
kings (Treiman 1977:2-4). On the other hand, his data show that such 
variations in social organization which create différences in power and 
* MATEJKO, Alexander J., Professor, Department of Sociology, University 
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1
 Another question if there really is such a reshuffle in a given society (we may 
be easily confused by some manifest changes which do not hâve any deeper impact). On 
the other hand, the political transformations may happen only on the surface of society 
and really do not count very much, or count, but in différent sensé than expected by us. 
We should not become too much confused by some clichés (capitalism, socialism, eli-
tism, egalitarianism, etc) without looking first what do they mean in social reality. 
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privilège among the occupational groups tend also to create correspon-
ding différences in prestige.2 For example, under the Soviet communism 
certain strategically located groups gain prestige as an addition to their 
power and privilège. This seems to be in conflict with the assumed by 
Treiman and other functionalists basic similarity in the spécifie «func-
tional imperatives» faced by ail societies.3 
Some différence may exist between what people think out to 
be and what really is. Occupations which exercise unusually great 
power, i.e. the secret police agents, or are exceptionally well re-
warded, i.e. the black marketeer, are not necessarily particularly 
highly regarded in societies, but this can not be proved by data utili-
zed by Treiman. For example, the occupational évaluations typical 
for the communist countries or for the places far removed from the 
modem nation states based on the market economy differ from the 
rest quite significantly (Treiman 1977:178). Physicians hâve not 
much income and power in the USSR but the social prestige is 
close to that enjoyed by the US doctors (Treiman 1977:194). 
Treiman assumes that there is a basic consensus in the socie-
ties regarding what is reasonable and socially useful. Such an as-
sumption seems to be dubious especially in thèse societies which 
are internally split and in which there is a deep internai crisis. The 
consensus regarding usefulness of various occupational groups 
2
 According to Duncan in the U.S. over four-fifths of the variance in the pres-
tige of individual occupations can be attributed to the combination of income and éduca-
tion (Dunan 1961). 
3
 D. J. Treiman on the basis of a comparative analysis of occupational hiérar-
chies in over 60 societies cornes to the conclusion that the occupational hiérarchies being 
deeply rooted in the division of labour are fundamentally the same in ail complex socie-
ties. Différences in power and privilège appear as more important than the cultural varia-
tions. «Prestige évaluations are affected by variations in generic aspects of social struc-
ture related to industrialization and (...) the évaluation of blue collar jobs is particularly 
sensitive to such variations (...). More highly industrialized countries tend to be more 
similar to the United States than less industrialized places : and among pairs of countries 
the greater the similarity in industrialization the greater the similarity in prestige ran-
kings. Thèse patterns tend to be stronger with respect to the évaluation of manual occu-
pations than of non-manual occupations, probably reflecting the fact that the process of 
industrialization créâtes greater différences in the organization of manual than of non-
manual work» (Treiman 1977:139). 
It is really so that the division of labour créâtes everywhere similar différences in the 
power, privilège and prestige associated with various occupational rôles ? 
Power différences appear not so much among occupations as among various subcatego-
ries of occupational groups depending on their stratégie location. Therefore, the conclu-
sion done by Treiman that « power différences among occupations are similar in ail socie-
ties» (1977:223) and that «Hiérarchies of privilège and hence of prestige will also be si-
milar in ail societies» (1977:224) does not seem to be adequately substantiated. The as-
sessment done by him deals only with the location of a given occupation versus other 
occupations. 
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seems to be very often quite low and this does not necessarily ap-
pear in the survey data. 
The progressing division of labour has contributed very substan-
tially to the social inequalities but we are now much less inclined than 
E. Durkheim (1947) and his followers to treat this division as something 
'objective' and unavoidable. It is widely accepted now that within the 
framework of a given technology it is possible to choose various alter-
natives of social organization even at the level directly related to work. 
At the higher organizational levels dependence on technology is even 
much lower or just non-existent. For example, on the auto assembly 
line the work cycle usually ranges from 30 to 90 seconds, but Swedes 
on the basis of their job enrichment experiments hâve corne to the 
conclusion that the optimum work cycles in manufacturing should be 
20 to 25 minutes for light assembly and 45 to 60 minutes for heavy as-
sembly (Job Reform in Sweden 1975:55). What more, they return in 
some cases to the man-paced assembly Unes as much less sensitive to 
disruption (the changes in production do not hâve to be rebalanced). 
The division of labour developes not only under the impact of 
technological progress but also under the pressure of organized occupa-
tional groups, mainly the professional, who by their joint effort try to 
secure for themselves some attractive privilèges. According to G. 
Ritzer, «Absolute authority over clients is a myth perpetrated by pro-
fessional s to enhance their ability to control clients imbuing in them the 
idea that they are supposed to be passive consumers of professional 
services» (Ritzer 1977:54). The power of occupational groups origina-
tes from their skill in gaining control over the areas of indeterminacy 
and/or uncertainty. This control is afterwards utilized for financial 
gains, high status, political influence and public relations. 
Also the organizational structures are not so much function of 
technology as of the basic control Systems related to planning, control 
of risks and exécution of orders (Woodward 1970). Size of the organi-
zation and the type of technology go together, but industrial relations 
and even the level of bureaucratization seem to be only slightly 
influenced by those both factors. For example, the increase of organi-
zational scale occurs along with increase of the proportion of necessary 
administrators only if this growth of scale goes closely together with 
increase of differentiation (Blau 1970, 1972). The existence of fairly 
predictable labour markets is necessary for a more advanced division 
of labour and specialization (March and Simon 1958; Burns and Stalker 
1961). 
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Of course, this does not mean that the level of technology4 is of 
no importance. Technology détermines both the opportunities for the 
exercise of discrétion by the worker and the level and content of tech-
nical expertise. For example, the direct intervention in the production 
process by semi-skilled workers diminishes as the level of automation 
increases. As degree of complexity increases, this is reflected in greater 
specialization and the necessity of more training, which both contribute 
to the higher demand of participation (Self-management tends to work 
better in more technologically developed circumstances and among 
more educated workers, but on the other hand the degree to which par-
ticipation is likely to be useful is inversely related to the specialized 
nature of the subject — Tiefenthal 1975). As environments become 
more complex and dynamic, more démocratie forms must be and are 
created (Gustavsen 1972). It is only under conditions of high develop-
ment and high differentiation that systemic participation and self-
regulation become possible, as extremely high interdependence politici-
zes formerly nonpolitical, nonparticipative structures (Mlinar and 
Teune 1972). 
Democracy has developed historically as a set of the décision ma-
king devices suitable either for the pre-market societies (but only for 
the tiny minority of free and well-to-do citizens) or for the industriali-
zing societies internally divided into the uneducated and passive mass 
and the elitist leadership (économie, cultural, political). In the post-
industrial societies conditions hâve become entirely différent and the 
basic concepts of democracy should be reworked in order to become 
again directly applicable to the immédiate reality of masses in work and 
leisure (Matejko 1978a). Rivalry between various autonomous pressure 
groups undermines the cohesiveness of the modem society. On the 
other hand, this cohesiveness is badly needed as the primary condition 
of maintaining the délicate internai and external balance of the sophis-
ticated modem apparatus of the présent day modem society (Matejko 
1978b). 
The market society is anticollectivistic in its true nature. Indivi-
duals are constantly agitated by the mass média that their own pleasure 
and wellbeing is of utmost importance. At the same time, the décline of 
religion takes away from the society such myths which so far hâve 
4
 This level may be measured, among others, by the level of capital invested 
per one employée. For example, in Canada it is per production worker $313,200 
($203,500 per employée in gênerai) in petroleum extraction, refining and pipeline tran-
sportation, but only $41,000 ($28,000 per employée in gênerai) in food and kindred pro-
ducts (The Conférence Board of Canada 1976. Road Map No. 1784). 
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provided a basis for its culture and social life. According to several 
prominent social thinkers and scientists, e.g. Toynbee, totalitarianism 
of a mass society becomes just unavoidable. Others think that is pos-
sible to avoid this tragic alternative by development of a direct demo-
cracy which at the same time would fit well into the needs and necessi-
ties of a postindustrial society. 
The démocratie job reform (autonomous groups, ombudsmen, par-
ticipation of employées in décision making at various levels,5 profit 
sharing etc) makes sensé only when it leads to the changes of power 
structure. On the other hand thèse changes in some cases may go so 
far that they would undermine the économie effectiveness of the exis-
ting institutions. In this respect any rapid transformations may become 
particularly dangerous, but waiting too long is also bad. The question is 
if in the post-industrial society there will be enough reasonable, honest 
and commited people who would be able and willing to support the al-
ternative Systems but who at the same time would reject the radical 
measures. In the market society people are accustomed just to follow 
changing fashions and to jump from one band wagon to another. The 
'mass' society is very vulnérable to manipulation and may envolve in 
the direction of a leftist or a rightist totalitarianism. 
THE POWER SETTING OF PARTICIPATION 
The démocratie job reform is full of pitfalls and should be develo-
ped on an expérimental basis. However, this reform in the market so-
ciety becomes almost unavoidably the object of bargaining between va-
rious pressure groups which look primarily for their own benefits at 
expense of everybody else. Politics of job reform consists mainly in 
gaining allies and isolating enemies of change. There is very often a 
great difficulty to mobilize people behind the participating scheme. The 
exclusion of any party with power (for example, management or specia-
s
 It is necessary to distinguish between two différent types of participation 
which lead to participatory schemes very much apart one from the other. Co-operation 
includes such issues as right of information, right to protest, right to suggestion, and right 
to consultation. AH of them are based on the principle of 'keeping the channels open' but 
without necessarily changing the power relations. On the other hand, co-determination 
may include right to veto (temporary or permanent), right to co-decision, and right to 
décision. Co-determination is much more farreaching than co-operation if ail parties with 
power are really participating (Thiefenthal 1975), and if the degree of participation is ba-
lanced with the désire that exists for it (Thiefenthal 1975). 
In the interest group model of participation ail who are affected participate in the 
decision-making of the enterprise (Roosevelt 1970 ; Deckard and Sherman 1972 ; Rhenman 
1964; Dahl 1970; Ellerman 1973). 
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lists) from participation undermines its ability to function properly. On 
the other hand, the promotion of participation without appealing to real 
interests of people who are involved also misses the vital point. An ef-
fective participation should be based on sharing at least some common 
goals among involved parties (Tiefenthal 1975) because without it, it 
would be difficult even to communicate. 
The change of the power balance is commonly expected as the 
outcome of participation. According to Poole « The more workers par-
ticipate in décision-making processes, the greater will be their chances 
of understanding the nature of social class relations and of developing 
distinct orientations in work» (Poole 1975:93) «An effective démocra-
tie strategy must genuinely change the balance of power in favour of 
employées and not merely give a démocratie façade to an otherwise au-
thoritarian structure» we read in Fabian Tract 431 (1974:7). However 
in reality there is a strong opposition to any substantial change in the 
power balance. It is significant that both Soviet communists as the 
Western capitalists are commited to the planned organizational deve-
lopment in ways which do not al ter fundamental power relationships. 
In the state socialist enterprises central authority sets gênerai parame-
ters to be presented to lower levels for goal setting, with the budget 
going through one or more itération of upward or downward move-
ment. Plans formulated at an élite level are legitimated by lower éche-
lons of the hierarchy through consultative procédures, but the final say 
belongs to the élite. There are some striking similarities in this respect 
between the East and the West (Hofstede 1972). 
Even in the case of the Yugoslavian management participation 
model there are doubts how much does it really contribute to changing 
power relations. The claim of Meister (1964, 1971) that within Yugosla-
via the workers' control is collapsing into the standard hiérarchie en-
terprise form may go too far, but it is true that workers there become 
squeezed between the technostructure at the workplace (managers, 
specialists) and the bureaustructure outside of it (state officiais) (Bucar 
1972). According to Obradovic, participation in the Yugoslav workers' 
councils is dominated «by a small of top managers and professional 
staff employées, who also tend to be better educated and to be mem-
bers of the League of Communists» (Obradovic 1975:43). Rus says 
that in Yugoslavia the management and administrative staff hâve power 
without responsibility and the workers' council has responsibility with-
out power (Rus 1970:151). 
In the West the implementation of participation so far is parado-
xically much more common among management than among unions. In 
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the 1940s and early 1950s, nearly three quarters of the joint consulta-
tion schemes in Great Britain had been set by management alone (Joint 
Consultation in British Industry 1952) « Managements hâve only sought 
to institute broader programmes when the power of workers has been 
sufficiently strong, or when they hâve internalized certain gênerai idéo-
logies (...) chief among thèse being humanist, religious or an overriding 
commitment to industnal efficiency» (Poole 1975:56). On the other 
hand, the union staff members hâve vested interest to integrate partici-
patory schemes into the existing union structure. 
Unions are afraid that participation will be utilized by manage-
ment in order to bypass union channels (Garson 1974). The worse the 
state of industnal relations the more vehemently does the union reject 
the idea of management participation. When union officers believe that 
union influence stems from frustrations among members, «Anything 
which is presented as likely to alleviate this dis satisfaction is then per-
ceived as a long-term threat for the union» (Delamotte and Walker 
1975:8). 
The level of union democracy has also something to do with the 
union policy versus management participation. In Great Britain « union 
officiais who were at the forefront in debates on industnal democracy 
were also those who were relatively more responsive to démocratie 
pressures within their own organizations» (Poole 1975:124).6 
Another question is how much the participatory schemes are so 
far concerned with matters of real interest to the workers. In Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway, Holland etc. the rôle of worker-directors is quite 
substantial. However, at the same time there is an évident apathy of the 
working masses. They are not interested in participation except in so 
far as it provides them with some immédiate rewards.7 In West Ger-
many very few workers hâve any detailed knowledge of the functioning 
of co-determination. In the British nationalized mines only 7 per cent 
6
 Attendance at the union branch meetings in Great Britain is 3 to 15 per cent 
(Roberts 1956) and in the élections only 29 per cent of union stewards are opposed (Go-
vernmental Social Survey 1968). 
7
 The worker-directors who represent workers' interest at the supervisory 
boards of corporations cannot draw up policies of their own but only modify and ques-
tion the proposais of other directors (Jenkins 1975). According to the 1976 law in West 
German companies with over 2,000 employées, the labour représentatives hâve a half of 
the twelve seats on supverisory boards. The 1976 proposais of the European Commission 
suggest the élection of employée représentatives by employée themselves (but with an 
appropriate protection of the union rights), and the full equality on the supervisory board 
of employée représentatives with other directs. 
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of the workforce had ever asked a représentative to the consultative 
committee to take up a problem of any kind, and only 28 per cent of 
those few who asked gained any satisfaction. Very many among the in-
terviewed workers knew nothing about consultative committees (Poole 
1975: 143-144). Even the Swedish experiments in teamwork and parti-
cipation may look differently when seen from the perspective of ano-
ther work culture. 
American workers who at the end of 1974 spend on the expérimen-
tal basis four weeks in jobs at the Saab-Scania car engine assembly 
plant found the work conditions in gênerai better than in their Dé-
troit automobile plant, but the cultural différences far overshado-
wed the différences in the way the workplace was organized. «The 
American workers's rights, their sensé of «being their own person» 
(...), their freedom to object to what they don't like and to press 
their needs without the fear of the conséquences seemed far more 
important to them than how their task is organized, or how changes 
relieve boredom or make for a better feeling at work, or whether 
they are represented on a council or committee» (Work Experi-
ment 1976:40). The high degree of concentration and effort deman-
ded of the Swedish female teams assemblers8 was definitely objec-
ted to by the American maie workers who preferred to work stea-
dily but at slower pace. For Americans there was in Sweden too 
much social organization and pressure related to it. The trade 
unions were too far from the daily existence of workers. 
Commitment to participation dépends very much on the educational le-
vel and organizational location of workers. The lower the job, the less 
likely the incumbent is to express positive attitudes towards the 
concept of participation. Those with less schooling are more likely to 
see participation only in terms of profit sharing and are more likely to 
be in favour of a gênerai assembly of workers as the decision-making 
body9 (Talb and Goldfarb 1970). Skilled workers are likely to be more 
interested in participation than their less skilled colleagues. The well 
qualified and responsible catégories of the personnel show more inte-
rest in participation than others. The higher one goes in the hierarchy 
the greater the proportion of people who want to participate (Tiefenthal 
1975). 
8
 They constituted only a tiny minority of ail factory workers who mostly 
worker on the traditional basis. 
9
 According to Garson, « Not only it is physically impossible to make numerous 
décisions in some sort of mass-meeting or plébiscite formant, but managers and em-
ployées alike will ordinarily not wish to trade time for participation in unnecessary 
meetings-unnecessary in the sensé that the preferred décision would occur without the 
need for participation by the individual involved» (Garson 1975:32). 
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Workers tend to resist any attempts to impose unfamiliar and 
hence unpredictable changes from which they are not certain that they 
will benefit (Guest and Fatchett 1974). It is necessary to gradually gain 
their trust by showing pièce by what may be gained by them when ac-
cepting participation. The unskilled or semi-skilled workers hâve a 
short term orientation and a concern with immédiate gratification. They 
prefer the profits to be distributed instead of them to be reinvested10 
(Kolaja 1965). The blue collar worker in developed societies is in gêne-
rai primarily concerned with maximizing satisfaction as a consumer, 
and it would be naive to expect from him a continued and active inte-
rest in indirect participation. 
Those not interested in participation are often young women, less 
qualified employées, workers who hâve been a relatively short time 
with the firm (Holter 1965). In Yugoslavia the working-class youth are 
more favourable than their elders to the idea of self-management, but 
at the same time they view the System as marginal to their personal 
concerns (Vrcan 1973, Suvar 1973). In Great Britain young workers do 
not want to participate in management (Guest and Fatchett 1974). Like 
other workers they are primarily interested in advancing and defending 
their pay, security and social relations. 
On the other hand once workers hâve had some positive expé-
rience in participation they tend to want it more. Low real participation 
reinforces low désire to participate, but high real participation reinfor-
ces the désire for it (Rus 1972, Kavcic 1972, Hampden-Turner 1973). 
Participation works best when people are use to it (Tiefenthal 1975). 
There is a dynamic relationship between the practice of participation 
and the opinion about it among employées. Work Systems and value 
Systems tend to constitute self-reinforcing cycles (Kavcic 1972, Crozier 
1964). It is worth to mention that the switch to a coopérative arrange-
ment in some small British enterprises has led to taking by workers a 
variety of responsibilities, this means something completely opposite to 
the traditional insistence among them to do only what is in a given job 
description (Carnoy and Levin 1976). So far either participation defini-
tely contributes to better social climate of workplace and to higher 
productivity, or at least there is not empirical évidence that employée 
participation correlates with low efficiency, low profits and inadéquate 
investment. 
10
 It may be claimed that in the labour-managed enterprises (Vanek 1975) «Poli-
cies that increase the wealth of the firm over some stretch of time, but do not improve 
the appropriable real incomes of the décision makers during this same period, are not 
likely to be considered désirable, and will tend to be rejected» (Furubotn 1976:122). 
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STRATEGIES OF PARTICIPATION 
According to Herbst (1976) there are various possible stratégies of 
transforming the traditional hierarchical organization into a 'participa-
tory' organization. Ail of them obviously hâve some advantages but 
also some disadvantages. The top-down approach is based on a process 
of downward cascading motivational policy commitment inspired and 
promoted starting from the top and gradually infiltrating the bottom. 
The question remains how much of the bottom of the hierarchy beco-
mes really involved in order to transform the spirit of the whole orga-
nization. The center-down approach starts from the middle manage-
ment and makes of it the major change agent. Hère the major obstacle 
is the inconsistency between the traditional management prérogatives 
and the goal to make workers collectively involved. Activisation of the 
rank-and-file initiative has to go together with the entirely new profile 
of middle management rôle and therefore its présent occupants are not 
necessarily best suitable to be the chief innovators. 
The horizontal project groups approach allows to establish ad hoc 
task teams of a temporary nature whose existence is totally dépendent 
on the changing nature of problems encountered. This solution allows a 
high flexibility and adaptability but has to go together with management 
by objectives, this means with the high autonomy and accountability of 
teams. The horizontal project groups allow to make the best use of va-
rious specialists who supplément each other. 
The participant design approach makes the employées from va-
rious levels of the hierarchy directly involved from the beginning in 
both the design and the implementation of the 'participatory' organiza-
tion. It is simultaneously an educational as well as practical project 
which needs some elementary concensus among ail involved partners, 
but also some skill. Quite often only during the implementation period 
it becomes évident that partners differ very much in their expectations 
and understanding what participation is really about. 
In the center-out approach the locus of change is on the center of 
the organization and spreads out according to the progressing consé-
quences of this what happens in the transformed center. The middle 
managers instead of trying to organize their subordinates into autono-
mous task groups may themselves establish and join such a managerial 
group and this way to create the new situation to which the rest of the 
organization has to adapt itself. 
The (do it yourself approach is one of the main stratégie directi-
ves which arise of the Scandinavian experiments in job reform. People 
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should become actively involved in the re-design of their own workpla-
ces and the rôle of experts and consultants become s limited. A self-
sustained learning process from the expérience gained by people thanks 
to the re-design projects should be rewarding and fully meaningful (an 
adéquate inducement). People should be trusted. The more the indivi-
duals are enabled to exercise control over their tasks, and to relate 
their efforts to those of the fellows, the more likely they are willing to 
accept a positive commitment to do a good job (Emery and Thorsrud 
1976:11; Fox 1974). 
Another learning from the Scandinavian expérience is the neces-
sity to base the job reform on some basic mutual consent of ail invol-
ved partners. The promotors of the job reform projects pay a lot of ef-
fort and attention to the accomodation of them to the power balance of 
a given social setting and to its culture. The projects are focused on 
such workplaces in which there is the best promise to secure and Pro-
ject everyone's vital interests. Expérimentation directly oriented 
against one of the partners or against profitability, productivity, work 
discipline and employment security does not much promise to succeed. 
The Scandinavian promotors of the job reform projects usually 
agrée that in order to start and succeed they hâve to be backed jointly 
by experts, organized labour and management. The mutual relationship 
between the content and scope of thèse experiments on the one side 
and the collective agreements on the other side has to be clarified well 
in advance. An active rôle in thèse experiments for the union stewards 
as well as for the lower rank management is worth to be considered ; at 
least their vested interests should not be harmed right from the begin-
ning. Evaluation of the expérimental results should be treated as a joint 
business. 
Mutual trust between ail partners involved in the job reform expé-
rimentation and their willingness to try new organizational forms is 
very often treated now in Scandinavia as more important than any for-
mally established gênerai conditions of expérimentation. The first thing 
is to provide room for exercise in trust and freedom of initiative be-
cause the workers must gain enough occasion to learn, try new things 
and grow individually as well as collectively (Fox 1974). 
THE NEW POWER BALANCE AS PRODUCT OF PARTICIPATION 
According to Emery and Thorsrud (1976), the successful experi-
ments should be treated as models for shop floor democracy to be si-
mulated by other organizational units. The traditional management and 
52 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 34, NO 1 (1979) 
union philosophy should be exposed to the challenge of new facts and 
new expériences gained from the experiments above mentioned. The 
tight control Systems on the management side and the restrictive work 
practices on the side of organized labour should be shown as obsolète 
and socially harmful from the new perspective offered by the experi-
ments. A new philosophy of management as well as of labour, empha-
sizing the group commitment at ail levels from the bottom to the top, 
should be widely promoted. 
The control of the tasks within bureaucracies is jealously guarded 
by the supervisory ranks and this leads to tensions between the rank-
on-file initiative and the vested interests located at various levels of the 
bureaucratie hierarchy. Centralization of power and authority at the top 
and hesitancy to delegate them to lower levels prevents the rank-and-
file to commit themselves. 
There is a vicious circle of tightening up the control in any cen-
trally run organizations when they face any crisis. This practice 
unavoidably leads to the development of informai practices and in-
formai groups which act as défense mechanisms. The job reform 
projects should — according to Emery and Thorsrud — eliminate 
this vicious circle by being so designed that each organizational 
unit would be an autonomous task group simultaneously in the 
administrative as well as the social sensé. Both social System and 
the technical-administrative System should be so designed that they 
would support one another. «Neither System can make its maxi-
mum contribution to the performance of the overall system unless 
each is optimized with respect to each other» (Emery and Thorsrud 
1976:19). 
The autonomy of each organizational unit has to be limited by the 
more gênerai circumstances (community, enterprise, society) but this 
does not necessarily justify the authoritarian rule from above. The dif-
fusion of innovations usually is much more effective when it happens 
on a voluntary basis through simulation and incentives. 
The task team should be « enriched » as a human group by giving 
its members the joint opportunity to share jobs and responsibilities, or-
ganizing their mutual support, gaining together from the resuit s achieved 
through a collective effort. The team should hâve in gênerai not less 
than three or four people and not more than eight people ; larger groups 
are more prone to the crowd emotionalism and elitism. However, lar-
ger teams can be also very effective if they share a deep-rooted culture 
and if the parts of the group task are highly interdependent (Emery & 
Thorsrud 1976:163). Members of the team «must know that they can 
aim at targets that are explicit, realistic and challenging to them; and 
they must hâve a feedback of group performance» (Ibid. p. 164). There 
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is always a problem how to establish the optimal length and variety of 
tasks, how to integrate them in meaningful units, (inclusion of auxiliary 
and preparatory tasks), how to détermine the standards of performance 
and secure a feedback, how to make the job socially identifiable and 
respectful. In any job reform expérimentation is necessary to remember 
about such obvious conditions of making jobs attractive as making 
them challenging and promotional (learning), offering people récogni-
tion and reward for their efforts, opening some broader chances and 
leaving at least some décision to the discrétion of the individual. 
Within the work teams the coopération among their members will 
be very much strengthened by providing of interlocking tasks, job rota-
tion, mutual contact and mutual help, collective décision making in the 
fields vital to members, délégation of power to the whole team, limita-
tion or even total withdrawal of the direct interférence by the supervisors 
(management by objectives), application of the collective incentives for 
good performance (departmental bonus), intégration of the formai 
structure into the broader social organization of the team as a human 
group. 
«The establishment of semi-autonomous groups is strongly dé-
pendent on the ability of management to shift its primary attention 
from internai coordination and control to the régulation of the 
company's boundaries» (Emery and Thorsrud 1976:136). Within the 
changing environment the main task of management is to keep in touch 
with the world outside and to innovate the necessary modifications, to 
take care of the co-ordination between various organizational units. In-
ternai affairs may be left to autonomous groups of employées looking 
collectively after their own joint affairs. This kind of a division of la-
bour fits the best the modem conditions of dynamic markets, relatively 
sophisticated employées and specialized managers who do not necessa-
rily hâve to practice the power plays ail the time (about the historically 
changing rôle of power and authority see Martin 1977). «Authority is 
becoming a question of influence through compétence, through infor-
mation and through an ability to motivate people to pull together» 
(Emery and Thorsrud 1976:138). Emphasis in the sphère of values and 
norms is now on freedom and justice, not as before on diligence, obé-
dience and frugality. 
There is a necessity to reevaluate the rôle and status of manage-
ment in the perspective of a far reaching job reform oriented toward 
the activisation of the whole personnel within various forms of partici-
pation. According to Emery and Thorsrud, 
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The enterprise is interdependent with its environment and should 
strive for a steady state by maintaining a tolerable rate of progress 
towards its objectives and constancy of direction. In order to 
achieve its leadership, commitment of members, flexibility, sensé of 
commitment to a mission, distinctive compétence, and self régula-
tion of component parts ail are needed. The primary task of mana-
gement is not to coordinate internai variances but to match the po-
tential and actual capacities of the enterprise to the actual and po-
tential requirements of the environment. Autonomy of members 
and their sélective interdependence allows the enterprise to moti-
vate the rank-and-file as well as to allocate much more effectively 
the managerial effort (Emery and Thorsrud 1976:4-5). 
There are no universal recipies for participation which would be 
valid for ail circumstances. The social organization of workplaces is too 
much influenced by the local circumstances in order to fit into one gê-
nerai scheme. Participation should be differentiated in its forms, appli-
cations and stratégies according to the scope and depth of its attraction 
for various catégories of workers and employées. One universal 
scheme is not enough in this respect if the broad social appeal of parti-
cipation is concerned. The légal forms of participation hâve this impor-
tant disadvantage that quite often instead of opening room for expéri-
mentation they regulate in détail what and how should be done; they 
do not leave enought opportunity to invent schemes which would fit 
needs of the spécifie socio-economic realities. 
THE «MATRIX» AS A «MATURE » FORM11 
The traditional hierarchical organization is exposed to the growing 
extent to the external and internai contradictions which undermine its 
reliability and efficiency. This organization took its main strength from 
the permanent distinction between routine tasks and « responsible » 
tasks, and such a distinction has become obsolète in the modem world. 
The performance conditions are changing now too fast in order to jus-
tify the stable division of labour based on the smallest possible bits of 
work which lose their human significance. The vertical control becomes 
too much isolated from the external reality with which the organization 
deals ail the time. There is too much probability that the hierarchical 
organizations will be preoccupied mainly with their own vested inte-
rests and in the long run they will become maladapted, inefficient, even 
obsolète. 
11
 This subehapter is a part of A. Matejko, «The Structural Criteria of Social 
System Maturity» paper for the Fourth International Congress of Cybernetics and Sys-
tems. Social System Section, Amsterdam August 21-25, 1978. 
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There is more and more need for organizations based on much 
higher interdependence of tasks and rôles rather than on keeping them 
apart; communication and co-operation between various parts of the 
organization has to become much easier and more natural ; the steering 
of events within organizations has to by much more dispersed instead 
of being centralized at the top; démarcation of internai and external 
boundaries has to become somewhat flexible and temporary instead of 
remaining rigid and prespecified. 
The rigid division of labour, and of the entrenched vested inte-
rests behind it, becomes obsolète in the modem changing world. There 
is a growing need of flexibility within which tasks and people rotate in 
accordance with shifting organization priorities. Task teams are esta-
blished ad hoc in order to fulfill certain functions and to dissolve 
afterwards. The power and authority considérations must give room to 
the efficiency considérations and therefore also to the rejection of any 
ossified organizational forms serving as the nests of group vested inte-
rests. The responsibility and authority still must follow one another but 
this basis principle may be much easier implemented within the nonbu-
reaucratic organization because only there the authority may become 
decentralized and allocated exactly in the places where responsibility 
really is. 
The concept of a «matrix» organization develop by F. E. Emery, 
E. Thorsrud, Ph. G. Herbst and others mainly on the basis of their 
Norwegian organizational expérience, rejects the reductionist nature of 
bureaucracy and hierarchy. Instead of a rigid and very specified divi-
sion of labour a variety and flexibility are expected to dominate. There 
is a strong emphasis on interdependence, team work and coopération. 
In a «matrix» organization each member has its own specialized rôle 
but each has an overlapping compétence with some other members 
(Herbst 1976:33). A variety of structures substituting one another or 
appearing simultaneously is used as a framework for the overlapping 
compétences exercised by members. 
The new organizational forms of a « matrix » organization can not 
be imposed from outside by the experts but hâve to develop sponta-
neously from within the traditional hierarchical organization. «Auto-
nomy, freedom and responsibility can not be imposed» (Herbst 
1976:11). The most successful cases of a «matrix organization» are 
products of employées' groups who hâve been willing to take risk and 
responsibility in the conditions of a relative freedom from external in-
terférence (Herbst 1976:12). The alternative types of organization very 
often meet a very strong résistance in the still prédominant hierarchical 
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types because the existing social organization supports the latter. There 
are several individuals and groups who unavoidably must lose power 
and privilège under the «matrix» organization. 
The growth of a « matrix » organization has to be based on several 
new normative assumptions, and the models of «mature» social Sys-
tems may be particularly helpful in the formulation of the theoretical 
principles for research and practical development of new organizational 
forms. The above mentioned attempts to measure the level of systemic 
«maturity» were promoted with this in mind. 
SOCIOTECHNICS OF PARTICIPATION 
Implementation of participatory schemes12 may gain a lot from so-
ciotechnics, this means the set of directives of an effective action based 
on the empirically verified knowledge of social sciences (Podgorecki 
1975). There are in gênerai many obstacles in making social practice, 
for example, the practice of participation, much more effective. The 
customary ways of problem-solving may be too much influenced by lo-
cal vested interests. The planned and spontaneous processes may pene-
trate one another to such extent that any rational improvement of the 
existing arrangement becomes very difficult, if not impossible at ail. 
Formai organizations develop sometimes off the limits of penetrability 
and understanding. 
It is up to the sociotechnics to establish the most effective ways 
of overcoming such obstacles. The regularities ascertained by social 
scientists in the resuit of their insight and research should become 
translated into the teleological directives how to achieve certain goals 
in the most effective manner. Persuasion, coercion, manipulation and 
facilitation may be practiced in a whole variety of ways. 
In order to act in a sociotechnical manner it is necessary first of 
ail to clarify the value orientations and commitments of ail parties in-
volved in a given case: secondly to analyse the case and its circums-
tances; thirdly to review the existing scientific knowledge in terms of 
its applicability to a given case ; fourthly to translate the regularities in-
volved in this knowledge into the set of practical directives ; fifthly to 
confront the eventual gains with the eventual social costs in order to be 
12
 This subchapter is a part of A. Matejko «Contradictions of the Service — 
Oriented Society and Their Sociotechnical Implications» paper for the Fourth Internatio-
nal Conférence of the Research Committee in Sociotechnics (International Sociological 
Association), Rotterdam, November 28 th — December lst., 1977. 
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sure that it would be really worth to apply the given sociotechnical de-
vices. 
Take for example the observation that the greater the perceived 
conflict of interests between the subordinate and the organization the 
more likely the décision is to be made autocratically by the superior 
(Dufty 1975), and in addition another observation that in the case of an 
authoritarian management the more trivial the décision the more likely 
it is to be delegated (Dufty 1975). Both thèse observations seem to sug-
gest that in order to provide an adéquate basis for participation it 
would be necessary to: 1) eliminate as much as possible the sources of 
conflict between supervisors and subordinates, 2) promote common 
awareness that the peaceful problem-solving is in interest of ail invol-
ved parties, 3) avoid the dominance of agenda by trivial issues which 
are not of importance for the participating bodies. 
Take another observation that where a leader and a subordinate 
hâve wide differentials in compétence and expertise, participation tends 
to increase the power of the leader (Mulder 1973), and also on the 
other hand that the access to vital information is a very important 
source of power in organizations. The practical conclusion is that in es-
tablishing the participatory units it would be necessary to make them 
as homogenous as possible in compétence, expertise and information of 
members because only then the basic conditions are fulfilled for the re-
lative equality of power and privilège. Such a social organization which 
tolérâtes the great imbalance of power between its member is very vul-
nérable to internai conflict and imbalance. Another question is how 
inequality and performance are related to each other. Hierarchical or 
authoritarian leadership may lead to as good (or possibly better) per-
formance13 than démocratie or participative leadership, although thèse 
latter styles of leadership would seem to lead to greater job satisfac-
tion. ,4 Some ingrédient of inequality may be necessary in working 
units when the compétitive spirit is at stake. 
13
 Performance appears to be a function of motivational levels, abilities and 
traits, rôle perception, but of course also organizational constrains (ail those éléments or 
features of an organization which impinge on employées to décide or limit the behaviou-
ral content of their work — Woodward 1970) and, of course, also technology. 
14
 There is no convincing évidence that participation is strongly and causally re-
lated to job satisfaction in work situations. However, employées' attitudes towards mid-
dle management improve through increased involvement in decision-making (Lischeron 
and Wall 1975). Immédiate supervisors by controlling rewards and structuring work 
influence the ability and freedom of employées to pursue own goals and to gain satisfac-
tion. The peer-group influences can significantly shape an employée's effort (Roethlisber-
ger and Dickson 1939) and therefore it is up to the enlightened management to gain the 
approval by the peer-groups. 
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The sociotechnical approach may be particularly useful when dea-
ling with some difficult problems of participation. For example, there is 
a common fear among managers that participation will lead to chaos. 
On the other hand the social research seems to suggest that the démo-
cratie control structures may even increase the total organizational 
control levels, and this higher total control seems to be positively asso-
ciated with higher organizational performance (Tannenbaum 1968, 1974, 
Kavcic et ail 1971). Through participation subordinates are able to dis-
play an upward exertion of control (Guest and Fatchett 1974), and the 
more employées influence the decision-making structure of the work-
place or alternatively perceive that they influence it, the more they 
wish to participate in the workplace's affairs (Hespe and Little 1971). It 
is a sociotechnical question how to reconcile participation with organi-
zational order, democracy with responsible leadership, satisfaction with 
performance.15 In each of thèse cases the alternatives do not necessa-
rily exclude one another, but a satisfactory organizational solution must 
be found by the careful examination of the existing expérience. 
Sociotechnics of participation in order to be effective has to be 
very comprehensive in order to cover the whole spectrum of factors 
which influence the behaviour of people at work.16 Everything that 
energizes, directs and sustains this behaviour must be taken into consi-
dération. In order to become positively motivated to work, people first 
of ail must believe that the effort will lead to the accomplishment, that 
the adéquate rewards will follow, and that it is worth to bother about 
thèse rewards (Porter and Lawler 1968). People compare their rewards 
with the rewards received by others and they adequately establish their 
own expectancies. The self-esteem is playing in this respect an impor-
tant rôle and the pay differentials may be the source of low motiva-
15
 The job satisfaction does not necessarily influence the level of performance 
(Vroom found the corrélation between them only .14 in twenty various studies-Vroom 
1964) but there is a very strong évidence that an overall job satisfaction représents an 
important force in the décision of the individual to stay with the given employer, as well 
as to appear regularly at work (Porter and Steers 1973 ; Steers and Porter, eds. 1975). Job 
satisfaction as the sum total of an individual's met expectations on the job becomes par-
ticularly désirable when people grow in éducation and in the level of their expectations. 
Then they désire and gain satisfaction from an increased involvement in the matters of 
direct relevance to their work activities. 
16
 People in gênerai differ in their capability of growing with the job (Reif and 
Schoderbek 1966) as well as of organizing themselves in the work situations. Skilled 
workers tend to hâve better shop fioor organization than unskilled workers (Poole 
1975:112). The climate of social relations at work may become very much improved 
thanks to participation even if there is not a clear-cut relationship between introduction 
of direct participation per se and increased efficiency. 
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tion. n The participatory schemes should be designed in close rela-
tionship to the work organization. Issues of the work rôle profiles,18 
leadership style,19 material and non-material incentives, administrative 
efficiency and even of the external environment20 are of great impor-
tance for the success of participation. 
THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Job reform has been treated above as a peaceful and incrémental 
movement towards more 'mature' forms of work co-operation, em-
ployée participation and enlightened management. The political power 
of this movement cornes mainly from its educational and démonstrative 
function and not from the power struggle. 
Such a job reform will not satisfy people who are mainly interes-
ted in utilization of the worker control as a weapon to achieve the dras-
tic transformation of the power relations in the society. However, what 
really counts in the long run is the basic transformation of the existing 
relations based on the verified expérience and not the change of politi-
cal labels without even touching the content. In the state socialist eco-
17
 It should be hère mentioned that workers generally tend to overestimate the 
earnings of others (Lawler 1968, 1971). The pay differentials vary in various countries; 
they are higher in developing countries than in developed countries, lower in state socia-
list countries than in capitalist countries. 
18
 The social dimensions of work rôles exercise influence on performance and 
motivation of people. The highly prescribed, low discrétion (Jacques 1956, 1967) work 
rôles are characterized by mutual distrust between the subordinated people and their su-
pervisors, close supervision, impersonal rules and procédures, close coordination of the 
occupant's activities with those of others, penalty for failures or inadequacies of perfor-
mance, and handling of conflicts through group bargaining (Fox 1974:2628). Ail thèse 
characteristics may easily lead to low performance and low motivation. On the other 
hand, the multiple or even only the dual compliance of employées in the work situations 
(staff organization instead of a Une organization) may be the source of instability, résis-
tance against any change, and inefficiency (Dunn 1972). 
19
 The appropriate leadership style is a function of the nature of the task upon 
which the group is engaged, the power position of the leader within the organization, and 
the leadership relation between the leader and his subordinates (Fiedler 1967). 
20
 In the présent day developed societies there is almost everywhere a serious 
problem of work motivation. Inflation undermines the value of financial rewards; the 
growth of educational level and of aspirations makes many more ambitious people deeply 
dissatisfied with their répétitive work tasks; économie aspirations grow at a pace with 
wage increases and the middle class living standard is commonly expected but often not 
achieved ; the intrinsic satisfaction from work is expected by the large number of skilled 
workers and employées, but there has been still only limited effort to create organizatio-
nal conditions which would favour this satisfaction. 
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nomies the hierarchical organization remains intact even if the political 
structure is totally différent (Matejko 1974, Berliner 1976). 
The enthusiasts of industrial democracy quite often are of a so-
cialist persuasion and treat management participation as a vital part of 
a rule exercised by the masses liberated from capitalism. They are 
particularly impressed by the Yugoslav expérience and they would like 
to apply it to their own countries. It seems useful to discuss hère this 
question in détail. 
A lot may be said in defence of free market and the autonomy of 
producers as well as of consumers. So for the free market économies 
are much more open to the job reform initiatives than the centrally 
planned économies. The omnipotent state is extremely slow in giving 
its employées the participatory rights that would limit the discretionary 
power of bureaucrats. It is significant that now nobody défends the free 
market with more vigor than the oppositionists from Eastern Europe. 
For example, according to R. Selucky «If the market is abolished, the 
autonomy of économie units disappears. If the marked is abolished, ho-
rizontal relationship (i.e. exchange) among économie units also disap-
pears. If the market is abolished, the information coming from the 
consumers (demand) is either fully eut or at least quite irrelevant for 
producers. Then, the central plan is the only source supplyieg produ-
cers with relevant information for decision-making » (Selucky 1975:57). 
The demand of civil rights and the demand of self management 
has appeared in the Soviet bloc countries together with the demand of 
producers' autonomy. The wastage of human material and the poor 
management lead from time to time to the outbreak of the résistance 
against bureaucracy, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or in Poland in 1956, 
1970 and 1976. It is also significant that Communist China has been re-
luctant to introduce a decentralized control of the enterprises by their 
workers and to give them genuine powers in this respect in the nationa-
lized economy. Only in the early days after the seizure of power and 
some kind of workers' councils did function effectively in the private 
enterprises as the means of coercing capitalists (Harper 1971:138). 
After several transformations the Yugoslav system is now based 
on relatively small économie units within the enterprises. Thèse units 
are expected to practice collective décision making on ail sorts of mat-
ters. Within them function the basic cells of the ruling Party, trade 
unionism, youth organization and the women league. Ail thèse organi-
zations participate in the mechanism of the Workers' Control which is 
expected to be a powerful weapon against any abuse of the self-
management principles by the particularistic interest groups or indivi-
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duals. The économie units which are officially called the Basic Units of 
Associated Labour, enjoy guaranteed rights to make business outside 
the enterprise or even to withdraw from it if they are dissatisfied. In 
practice, however, they do not take advantage of thèse formai rights. 
The Yugoslav experts themselves admit that the implementation 
of self-governing socialism is in Yugoslavia full of contradictions. The 
state bureaucracy follows its own vested interests and limits the scope 
of self-management treated by M. Markovic as «the dialectical relation 
of so-called state socialism with its inhérent tendencies towards bu-
reaucratization» (Horvat et al. 1975:425). «The existence of the state 
in gênerai, especially so strong a state, automatically générâtes — says 
Markovic — bureaucratie tendencies which are by their nature, ten-
dencies to préserve it in its présent embryonic and limited forms» 
(Horvat et al. 1975:433). There are in addition contradictions between 
self-management and the authority and discipline which the central plan 
forces,21 between self-management and the local bureaucratie élites, 
and between self-management and the market relations. 
The Yugoslav present-day model shows several tensions which 
are unavoidable in the case of an attempt to reconcile such divergent 
factors as the powerful state, one party rule,22 central planning, free 
market economy, and self-management at the local level. There is still 
21
 According to B. Horvat «the first principle in the organization of a self-
managed enterprise will be the création of sufficiently small and sufficiently homogeneous 
work groups, which allow direct participation of ail the members in making décisions and 
where décisions are sufficiently transparent. Homogeneity reduced the possibility of for-
ming a majority on the basis of minority interests, and participation and transparency re-
duced the possibility of manipulation and the imposition of opinions» (Horvat et al. 
1975:322). According to this author members of the collective décision making bodies 
must bear responsibility for their collective décisions, and the exécution of décisions 
must be a matter of expertise and not democracy. He is very much for « séparation of the 
value, interest sphère from the sphère of expertise; of political authority from professio-
nal authority; and of décisions about policy from the field of administration» (Horvat et 
al 1975:323). 
22
 From the Soviet point of view the Yugoslav model undermines the strength 
and unity of the socialist nation-state by fragmentation of it into competing parochial 
work collectives. The ruling party must remain the only governess of the whole society 
and any spontaneous activity of the segments of society should be limited if not totally 
excluded. «In the view of Soviet critics, the Yugoslav experiment has overstepped the 
boundaries of the désirable efforts to enlist local initiative, material incentives, and éco-
nomie accountability, by abandoning the organizational principle of centralized control 
exercised by the state...» (Sharp 1971:173). 
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an asymmetrical distribution of power at various level which undermi-
nes the effectiveness of self management.23 
According to Zupanov, the Western collective bargaining system 
is superior to the Yugoslav self-management system in effectively dea-
ling with industrial conflicts. The bargaining partners are not supposed 
to eliminate or subdue one another. The true interests of workers are 
represented. Participation, even if limited, is at least effective. The ma-
nagerial power is not commonly abused in an informai way. « Yugoslav 
executives are insecure about their power, which is very great in actua-
lity but modest in its institutional définition. Thus, need of their power 
is illegitimate and makes them extremely vulnérable in case of a strike » 
(Zupanov 1973:219-220). The Party functionaries play a power game 
between managers and workers. Zupanov says that «strong and auto-
nomous labour unions vigorously representing the interests and 
viewpoints of various sections of employées seem to be an indispensa-
ble part of structural arrangements for effective participation» (Horvat 
étal. 1975:84 vol. 2). 
In the Soviet bloc countries the workers' councils hâve appeared 
in the middle of 1960s as a weapon against the upper bureaucrats taken 
by the groups located at the enterprise level. For example, in Poland in 
1956 the workers' councils were introduced in order to improve the 
management of state enterprises run by the incompétent and narrow 
minded servants of the ruling party (Matejko 1974:130). The brocke-
rage function played by workers' councils is spécifie not only for the 
state socialism in Eastern Europe,24 but is not directly applicable to 
the free market économies where unions are independent and they 
hâve the well established communication channels with management 
and the state. 
Participatory democracy may and should be gradually introduced 
into the free market enterprises without necessarily referring to state 
23
 It is necessary to mention that the problems faced in Yugoslavia are only par-
tly related to the social ownership of the production means and the one party rule. There 
are several vital questions related to the gênerai issue of the relationship betv/een partici-
patory democracy and management, or between self-management units and the free 
market economy. In both thèse respects there is plenty to learn from the Yugoslav expé-
rience. 
24
 In Italy since the early 1970's the specialized workers councils (e.g. in Fiat 
work-environment council, piece-works and rhythms-of-work council, job catégories 
council) and worker-delegates play a rôle within the power relations between the mana-
gement and the unions. It is still an open question how much they are able to represent 
the interests of the rank-and-file, and on the other hand how much they just become ins-
truments of the union or management bureaucracies (Ramirez 1973:626). 
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socialism. Management participation may play an integrative rôle only 
as long as it is a vehicle to reform profoundly the jobs as well as the 
work organization in gênerai. In order to humanize the workplaces it is 
necessary first of ail to become aware of factors which influence the 
common welfare of working people, in addition to rémunération. The 
idea of a «matrix» organization should be gradually implemented on 
the basis of the trial and error approach. The more responsible and re-
liable citizenship will be the natural product of ail thèse efforts. 
Does it mean that the job reform movement has to be necessarily 
neutral in political sensé? I am arguing not for neutrality but primarily 
for the autonomy and freedom of this movement to pursue its own hu-
manistic, and not necessarily political goals. Any blind dependence on 
other movements, whose goals not necessarily coincide with the work 
humanization, must be harmful in the long run for the subject of a ge-
nuine job reform. 
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Les conséquences socio-politiques de la réforme du régime de 
travail 
La réforme démocratique du régime du travail dans l'entreprise est rem-
plie d'embûches et on ne doit s'y aventurer qu'à titre expérimental. 
En effet, dans une société fondée sur le marché du travail, cette réforme 
devient presque inévitablement l'objet de négociations entre différents groupes 
de pression qui lorgnent vers leurs propres avantages aux dépens d'autrui. La 
politique, dont on s'inspire, consiste surtout à se gagner des alliés et à isoler 
les adversaires du changement. L'exclusion de tout groupe doté de pouvoir 
(par exemple, les employeurs et les spécialistes) de la participation ôte toute 
possibilité d'agir normalement. 
Par ailleurs, l'instauration d'un régime de participation qui ne ferait pas 
appel aux intérêts réels des personnes intéressées perd sa raison d'être. Aussi, 
une participation efficace devrait-elle se fonder sur au moins quelques objectifs 
communs aux partenaires du milieu de travail, sans quoi il serait difficile d'éta-
blir une communication valable. 
On s'attend généralement à ce que l'avènement de la participation amène 
un changement dans la balance du pouvoir. Cependant, dans les faits, il existe 
toujours une forte opposition à tout changement marqué dans cette balance du 
pouvoir. Il est significatif que, ni les communistes russes, ni les capitalistes de 
l'Ouest ne se soient engagés dans un type de participation qui serait de nature 
a altérer les rapports de forces en présence. Dans les entreprises d'État socia-
listes, l'autorité centrale fixe les paramètres généraux des buts à atteindre 
qu'on présente ensuite aux instances inférieures, les budgets passant du som-
met à la base ou vice-versa dans un mouvement incessant. Les programmes 
mis au point au sommet sont endossés par les échelons inférieurs de la hiérar-
chie après consultation, mais le dernier mot revient toujours au sommet. Sous 
ce rapport, il y a des points de ressemblance entre ce qui se passe à l'Est et ce 
qui se produit à l'Ouest. 
Même dans le cas de l'expérience yougoslave, on peut douter que le type 
de participation qu'on y a établi soit réellement de nature à changer les rap-
ports de forces. La prétention de certains critiques occidentaux selon laquelle, 
en Yougoslavie, le contrôle de l'entreprise par les travailleurs se dissout dans 
la hiérarchie de l'entreprise tel qu'on la connaît ordinairement, est peut-être 
poussée un peu loin, mais il est quand même vrai que les travailleurs y sont 
coincés entre la structure technocratique du milieu de travail et la structure bu-
reaucratique de la société globale. 
On peut et on doit instaurer la participation démocratique des travailleurs 
dans les entreprises fonctionnant dans une société de marché libre sans néces-
sairement se référer au socialisme d'État. La participation de la direction ne 
peut remplir une fonction d'unification qu'en autant qu'elle sert d'instrument 
pour réformer en profondeur la structure des emplois aussi bien que l'organisa-
tion du travail en général. Pour humaniser l'entreprise, plus spécifiquement le 
milieu de travail, il faut d'abord que tous soient conscients des facteurs qui, en 
outre de la rémunération, influencent le bien-être ordinaire des gens. L'idée 
d'une organisation modèle doit être mise graduellement en œuvre selon une 
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approche à l'estime pour qu'un comportement responsable et durable devienne 
le résultat naturel de tous ces efforts. 
Cela signifie-t-il que le mouvement en matière de réforme du travail soit 
neutre dans le sens politique du terme? L'auteur ne préconise pas la neutralité 
mais avant tout l'autonomie et la liberté de ce mouvement en vue de poursui-
vre ses propres objectifs humains et non pas nécessairement des buts politi-
ques. Toute dépendance aveugle envers d'autres mouvements dont les fins ne 
coincident pas nécessairement avec l'humanisation du travail ne peut en der-
nier ressort qu'être dangereux pour l'implantation d'un véritable régime de ré-
forme du travail. 
La réforme démocratique du régime du travail (groupes autonomes, om-
budsmen, participation des employés à différents niveaux, intéressement) n'a 
de sens qu'en autant qu'elle entraîne une modification de la structure du pou-
voir. D'autre part, en certaines circonstances, ces mouvements peuvent aller 
jusqu'à miner l'efficacité économique des institutions existantes. Sous ce rap-
port, toute transformation trop rapide peut devenir fort dangereuse, mais il est 
aussi mauvais de trop attendre avant de passer à l'action. Il faut se demander 
si dans la société post-industrielle qui est la nôtre, il y aura assez de gens rai-
sonnables, honnêtes et engagés qui soient capables d'appuyer d'autres systè-
mes d'organisation du travail et le voudraient, tout en rejetant en même temps 
les mesures trop radicales. Dans la société de marché, les gens sont tout juste 
habitués à suivre les modes changeantes et à passer d'un spectacle à l'autre. 
La société de masse est exposée à être manipulée et peut évoluer vers un tota-
litarisme de gauche comme de droite. 
Les techniques sociales de participation, pour être efficaces doivent être 
comprises dans un sens large de manière à s'étendre à tout l'ensemble des fac-
teurs qui influencent le comportement des gens au travail. Il faut prendre en 
considération tout ce qui stimule, oriente et soutient ce comportement. Pour 
devenir motivés au travail, les intéressés devront d'abord être persuadés que 
l'effort donnera un résultat, qu'une rétribution adéquate s'ensuivra et qu'il 
vaudra la peine de se tourmenter pour l'obtenir. Les gens sont enclins à 
comparer les avantages qu'ils touchent avec ceux que les autres reçoivent, et 
ils établissent ainsi leurs propres aspirations. Sous ce rapport, l'amour-propre 
joue un rôle important et les différences de salaire peuvent être la source d'une 
motivation faible. Les mesures de participation doivent être établies en relation 
étroite avec l'organisation du travail. La publication des profils de poste, le 
style de direction, les stimulants financiers ou autres, l'efficacité administrative 
et même l'ambiance extérieure sont de grande importance pour assurer le suc-
cès de la participation. 
Dans cet article, la réforme du régime de travail est considérée comme 
un mouvement pacifique et dynamique capable de conduire à des formes de 
coopération au travail plus réfléchies, à la participation active des employés et 
à l'établissement d'une direction plus éclairée. La force politique de ce mou-
vement dérive principalement de sa fonction éducative et expansive et non de 
la recherche du pouvoir. 
Une réforme du régime de travail ainsi comprise ne satisfera pas ceux qui 
s'intéressent d'abord à l'utilisation du contrôle ouvrier en tant qu'une arme 
pour en arriver à une transformation draconienne des rapports de forces dans 
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la société. Ce qui importe vraiment à long terme, c'est la transformation fon-
damentale des relations existantes, transformation fondée sur l'expérience 
contrôlée et non pas sur des changements d'étiquette politique qui ne touchent 
même pas au contenu. Dans les économies d'État socialistes, l'organisation 
hiérarchique demeure intacte, même si la structure politique est totalement dif-
férente. En conséquence, il y a lieu d'espérer qu'une participation véritable à la 
direction pourra se développer d'une façon plus efficace dans les démocraties 
de l'Ouest que sous les systèmes politiques à parti unique. 
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